Anticorruption agencies: expressive, constructivist and strategic uses

This article explores the reasons for the introduction of anticorruption agencies of a specific type in Eastern Europe. It is argued that one of the important functions of these agencies—which are stronger on information gathering, coordination and strategy rather than on investigation of concrete cases—is to give to the government some leverage over the anticorruption discourse. Presenting the anticorruption commissions and agencies as (discourse-controlling) instruments gives an answer to the troubling question why governing parties are at all interested in the introduction of such bodies. Apart from instrumentalization in political discourse, anticorruption bodies in Eastern Europe have had other effects as well. As shown in the Baltic case, institutional engineering provides for a brief window of opportunity during which political forces committed to integrity could gain the upper hand. The problem in Eastern Europe, however, is not the lack of such windows of opportunities—it is more the lack of really committed political forces capable of continuous and consistent anticorruption effort

Political finance in Central Eastern Europe: an interim report

'Der Beitrag analysiert Gesetze und Regelungen über die Finanzierung von politischen Parteien und Wahlkampagnen in 17 Ländern: Albanien, Weißrussland, Bosnien-Herzegowina, Bulgarien, Kroatien, Tschechien, Estland, Ungarn, Lettland, Litauen, Mazedonien, Moldawien, Polen, Rumänien, Russland, Slowakei und Ukraine. Er bietet einen Überblick über die Kosten der Politik in einigen dieser Länder und stellt Hypothesen auf zu Mustern der Politikfinanzierung in Mittelosteuropa. Ein zentrales Ergebnis ist die Vielfalt der Politikfinanzierung in den untersuchten Ländern, was zumindest teilweise auf die unterschiedlichen historischen, politischen, sozialen und ökonomischen Merkmale der Länder in der Region zurückzuführen ist. Nach der Häufigkeit der angewandten Regelungen und Förderungen in den behandelten Ländern ergibt sich folgende Reihung: freie Sendungen in Radio und/oder TV: 100%; direkte staatliche Unterstützung von Parteien und/oder KandidatInnen: 76%; Ausgabenbeschränkungen (für Parteien und/oder KandidatInnen): 59%; Beschränkungen der Spenden an Parteien und/oder KandidatInnen: 47%. Die geringe Bedeutung von Mitgliedsbeiträgen scheint ein hervorstechendes Merkmal zu sein. In einigen der untersuchten Länder sind reiche 'Oligarchen' als politische Finanziers aufgetreten, und einige post-kommunistische Parteien sind nach wie vor stark von Mieteinnahmen aus Gebäuden abhängig, die sie von den früheren kommunistischen Regimes geerbt haben.' (Autorenreferat)'The article analyses laws and regulations concerning the financing of political parties and election campaigns in 17 countries: Albania, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. It surveys the evidence about the costs of politics in some of these countries and considers hypotheses about the patterns of political finance in Central Eastern Europe. A principal theme of the article is the diversity of political financing in the countries under review. This is at least partly attributable to the variety of historical, political, social and economic characteristics of the countries in the region. Ranked by the frequency with which they occur in the countries covered by the article, the main kinds of regulations and subsidies are: free radio and/or television broadcasting: 100%, direct public funding of parties and/or candidates: 76%; spending limits (on parties and/or candidates): 59%; limits on contributions to parties and/or candidates: 47%. The absence of significant funding from subscriptions of party members seems to be a marked characteristic. In some of the countries under review, wealthy 'oligarchs' have emerged as important political funders, and some post-communist parties continue to depend largely on the rental income of buildings which they inherited from the former Communist regimes.' (author's abstract

Deliberative Democracy in the EU. Countering Populism with Participation and Debate. CEPS Paperback

Elections are the preferred way to freely transfer power from one term to the next and from one political party or coalition to another. They are an essential element of democracy. But if the process of power transfer is corrupted, democracy risks collapse. Reliance on voters, civil society organisations and neutral observers to fully exercise their freedoms as laid down in international human rights conventions is an integral part of holding democratic elections. Without free, fair and regular elections, liberal democracy is inconceivable. Elections are no guarantee that democracy will take root and hold, however. If the history of political participation in Europe over the past 800 years is anything to go by, successful attempts at gaining voice have been patchy, while leaders’ attempts to silence these voices and consolidate their own power have been almost constant (Blockmans, 2020). Recent developments in certain EU member states have again shown us that democratically elected leaders will try and use majoritarian rule to curb freedoms, overstep the constitutional limits of their powers, protect the interests of their cronies and recycle themselves through seemingly free and fair elections. In their recent book How Democracies Die, two Harvard professors of politics write: “Since the end of the Cold War, most democratic breakdowns have been caused not by generals and soldiers but by elected governments themselves” (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018)

Direct Democracy in the EU –The Myth of a Citizens’ Union. CEPS Paperback, November 2018

The European Union has a democracy problem. The polycrisis that has plagued the EU for years has led to a cacophony of voices calling for fundamental change to the integration project. Yet despite the shock of the Brexit referendum and the electoral upsets caused by nativist parties across the continent, few of the plans for EU reform include concrete proposals to address the perennial democratic deficit. This book looks at how the relationship between citizens, the state and EU institutions has changed in a multi-layered Union. As such, it focuses more on polity than on populism, and does not engage deeply with policy or output legitimacy. Building on the notion of increasing social, economic and political interdependence across borders, this book asks whether a sense of solidarity and European identity can be rescued from the bottom up by empowering citizens to ‘take back control’ of their Union. Direct Democracy in the EU: The Myth of a Citizens’ Union is part of the 'Towards a Citizens’ Union' project and is the product of collaboration with 20 renowned think tanks from the European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN). It is the first of three publications that will also cover the state of representative democracy in the EU and the accountability of democratic institutions